Every now and then, we keep hearing of discussions wherein people rue intellectual foundations of Indian Armed Forces in general and Indian Army in particular. A not so recent case being Land Forces Doctrine 2018 and reforms spearheaded by Army Headquarters in recent times. Senior leadership is often accused of “discussing after deciding” and “decisions taken without adequate thought”. In 21st century when warfare is evolving rapidly, we can ill afford to be less than ready, therefore, there is a need to lay solid intellectual foundation within Army to steer it efficiently in wake of these changes.
Brilliant Commanders versus Brilliant Armies
In Third Century BC Hannibal of Carthage (modern day Tunisia) took his elephants across Alps to register a great victory over Romans at Cannae[i]. He was a brilliant tactician, well heard (he used to hear tales from travellers, since there wasn’t much available to read), an audacious and brave leader. In 4th century BC, Alexander of Macedonia started an unprecedented victory march to east, defeating Persian Empire and reaching the shores of Indus[ii].
The story of brilliant commanders continues with Mehmed II of Ottoman Empire in 15th century who got his ships dragged overland on logs to float them again in Golden Horn thereby defeating the Eastern Roman Empire (also called Byzantine empire) by snatching their crown jewel Constantinople (modern day Istanbul)[iii]. In more recent time Napoleon Bonaparte, an artillery Captain of Corsica, defeated several European armies in battles fought with uncanny genius in early 19th century.
All these Commanders were young men in 20s or 30s who had a penchant for reading/ listening, they were audacious and tactical geniuses who led famous victories for their armies. But what happened after them? Alexander’s empire got embroiled in internal feuds immediately after his death, Hannibal’s army was defeated and destroyed within his lifetime, Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo and exiled forever. Only exception being Ottomans who continued to expand their empire due to a unique succession arrangement which only chose the most brilliant among the royal offspring’s (there were hundreds to choose from) as the next king.
There are several things to be learnt from these brilliant commanders but what is important to note here is, they can only last few years or few decades, their brilliance fades and therefore some system is required to sustain this brilliance. Herein lies the importance of “Institutional Brilliance”. In Indian Army we don’t just require one brilliant commander but we need to ensure institutional brilliance which provides a chain of commanders, each as capable as other to ensure that the Army sustains its edge over adversaries in times to come.
How to Ensure Institutional Brilliance?
The question was admirably tackled some 200 years ago by then Prussia, inspired from Napoleon’s concept of “Grande Armies”, Prussian Lieutenant Colonel Gerhard von Scharnhorst laid the foundation of Concept of General Staff[iv] which became the core of battlefield brilliance for Prussian and its successor German Army for next more about 150 years. The Israeli army, arguably the most unlikely but real successor of this brilliance understood the issue well after the reverses in 1973 Arab-Israel War and 1982 Lebanon War. They had brilliant field commanders but no institutional memory. Israel instituted a program called “Talpiot[v]” in 1979 to ensure continued institutional brilliance in defence research and development. Both these programs are instructive as to what is required to ensure institutional brilliance in armies.
In both cases a small group of individuals were chosen carefully and trained well to ensure a “Core of Competent Officers” who were to ensure that their armies were able to overcome fallacies of Individual Commanders. Both these programs ensured/ are ensuring that the edge of these armies was maintained/ is being maintained. The examples show that a template already exists for institutional brilliance and there is a need to adapt this in Indian context to ensure the same for Indian Army as well.
Who should Learn?
All should learn a little, some should learn a lot. It is a hard fact that each of Indian Army’s more than 40 thousand officers need to learn more about military history and its lessons. As of now, one campaign that everyone is fond of referring to, is the campaign they have studied while preparing for staff college examination. Part B/ Part D examinations also have military history papers but their studies remain mostly superficial, therefore, there is need to ensure that everyone studies more of military history.
Some among these Officers, need to be chosen at military academies, in career courses such as Young Officers Course, Junior Command Course or Staff College, all based on their flare and talent for science of warfare to study more and deeper, about wars, its history, geographies, operational art, strategy, technology and new concepts of warfare to ensure a dedicated corps of officers to advise and lead the army in the years to come. The selection, thus made, should not be final. Officers must be sent out or brought in based on actual performance evaluation at each successive stage. These Officers should be given wide experience in handling challenging assignments in their careers.
From Where to Learn?
This has an easy answer. The best way to learn anything is by example, therefore studying wars is the best way to learn for students of warfare. There is a need to re-emphasise study of military history in Indian Army from its present and rather superficial approach. Instead of getting lured by fancy words thrown by western academics every year such as 4th generation warfare, Revolution in Military Affairs, Grey Zone Warfare, Non-Contact Warfare and so on (the list is endless), we should focus on brass-tacks. Afterall all theory gets tested in practice during wars only.
How to Do It?
Three methods proposed to overhaul process of learning in Indian Army are given below: -
· Education
· Structural Overhaul
· Cultural Change
Education.
· Part B and Part D should include military history campaigns as it exists today. However, it is recommended that the Question Papers of these exams should test the “understanding” of the campaign more than the “facts” of the campaign.
· Staff college preparation should include study of two wars. Among them, one of the campaigns should be a recent one to bring about changes in nature of Warfare. Once in staff college, each tutorial should have one military history campaign presentation by each student.
· Dissertation of staff college should focus on various wars, rather than abstract topics and policy issues. All dissertations should be uploaded online for restricted access, thereby ensuring greater quality control.
· Higher Command and National defence college should involve study of conduct of various wars from operational/ strategic point of view. Dissertations at these levels may focus on policy/ economic/ political aspects of war.
Structural Overhaul.
· There is a requirement to establish a History Division in Military Operations Directorate in Army Headquarters. This should have sections for Topography, Mobilization, Firepower, Joint Operations and New Warfare sub-divisions (proposed Divisions are similar to Prussian Great General Staff).
· The division should provide advise based on historical experience on operational matters, conduct studies to validate plans and be the institutional learning hub on operational matters.
· Methods of Institutional Learning such as deployment in active War Zones, Joint Exercises with important militaries and deployment as Defence Attaché’s should be assigned with aim of enhancing institutional knowledge rather than on rotation basis.
· Think tanks like Centre for Land Warfare Studies should be Captive think tank of Indian Army manned with outside experts including academicians to provide a second opinion as and when required.
Cultural Change.
· Ultimately all reforms will succeed only if there is vigorous push to adopt them. There is a need to ensure that better learning is acknowledged and promoted in army. It will be wiser to focus on serious military studies than minor Staff Duties or fancy words which do nothing but add to confusion in understanding even simple concepts.
· Armed Forces are an honourable profession. This entails, serving with pride and honour. Army should allow anyone who wants to leave, to leave. It’s a very important statement of intent that should come from very top (This reminds of Moshe Dayan’s initiative to ease out officers in Israeli Army in 1950s as Chief of Staff[vi]). What matters is not the number of Officers but the number of Officers willing and motivated to serve this Army.
Parting Thoughts
More often than not, our modernization plans focus on machines, concepts and words. There is a need to focus on the man behind the machine. This is the costless reform option and it only requires will to succeed. A single reform to create a hub of knowledge within officer cadre will ensure institutional excellence of Indian Army in decades to come thereby ensuring that victory in future conflicts will always be ours.
[i] G K Cunningham, Podcast discussion with anchor Andrew A Hill, Podcast discusses exploits of Hannibal. Mr Cunningham is Professor of Strategic Landpower at the U.S. Army War College while Mr Andrew A. Hill is the WAR ROOM Editor-in-Chief. The podcast was accessed on 24 May 20. It is available on link https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/special-series/great-captains/hannibal-and-the-march-through-the-alps-great-captains/
[ii] Joshua J Mark, Alexander the Great, article published on 14 November 2013. Map of Alexander’s conquests is also sourced from this article. Accessed on 24 May 2020. It is available on link https://www.ancient.eu/Alexander_the_Great/
[iii] Zain Khokhar, Mehmad II, published on 13 May 2020, accessed on 24 May 2020. As per the article “A new strategy was necessary for the Ottomans, and Mehmed crafted an ingenious solution to the Byzantine naval blockade in the Golden Horn. On 22 April, he ordered his naval forces to circumvent the Byzantine chain by using oxen to drag his warships across the land in Pera and pushing them back into the sea inside the Golden Horn.” The article is available on link https://www.ancient.eu/Mehmed_II/
[iv] Jason M. Bender, Non-Technical Military Innovation: The Prussian General Staff and Professional Military Education, undated article published in Small Wars Journal, accessed on 24 May 2020. As per the author, “in looking at the Prussian example of the creation of the General Staff in the early nineteenth century, an example is provided that illustrates a very successful non-technical, administrative military innovation which not only greatly upset the overmatch of Napoleonic dynastic military power, but continued to resonate in Germany during the interwar period between World War I and World War II.” The article can be accessed at link https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/non-technical-military-innovation-the-prussian-general-staff-and-professional-military-educ
[v] Jennifer Laszlo Mizrahi, Israel’s Edge: The Story of the IDF’s Most Elite Unit — Talpiot, article reviews the book “Israel’s Edge: The Story of the IDF’s Most Elite Unit — Talpiot”, authored by Jason Gewirtz on the subject. The article was published on 05 May 2020. It was accessed on 24 May 2020 and it is available on link https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/israels-edge-the-story-of-the-idfs-most-elite-unit-talpiot-2/
[vi]Shabtai Teveth, Moshe Dayan :The Soldier, The Man, The Legend, Pp 255–258, published by Himalayan Books 2015 (reprint edition).
